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ABSTRACT 
In space, the controlled release of certain cargoes is no 
less useful than the maritime jettisons from which they 
take their name but is also much more dangerous.  
Experience has shown that jettisons can be performed 
safely, but the process is complicated with the path to 
performing a jettison taking months or even years.  In 
the background, time is also required to write 
procedures, train the crew, configure the vehicle, and 
many other activities.  
 
This paper outlines the current process used by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) for manual jettisons, detailing the methods 
used to assure that the jettisons and the jettisoned 
objects are as safe as achievable and that the crew is 
adequately trained to be able to affect the safe jettison.  
The goal of this paper is not only to capture what it 
takes to perform safe jettisons in the near Earth 
environment but to extrapolate this knowledge to future 
space exploration scenarios that will likely have 
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and International Partner 
(IP) interfaces.   
 
1. BACKGROUND 
Manual EVA jettison is sometimes considered a viable 
option for items that pose a safety issue for return 
onboard a visiting vehicle, items that negatively impact 
International Space Station (ISS) and/or Space Shuttle 
utilization or manifests, items that represent an EVA 
timeline savings, and/or items that are designed 
specifically for jettison [1].  In space this controlled 
release is much more dangerous due to hazards such as 
those involved with the hardware disconnection and 
handling, collision and large mass handling issues, 
collision with the crew and / or their vehicle, thermal 
extremes, and risk to persons on the ground.  Sometimes 
the option to hold on to an item and either return it to 
Earth or keep it on orbit indefinitely is impossible or 
because it will impose an unnecessary risk to the crew, 
vehicle, or program. 
 
Ever since man began to launch objects into orbit and 
physically explore the cosmos, dropping unnecessary 
cargo en route (similar to the concept of use of in-situ-
type resources) has been a viable option.  Shuttle and 
ISS missions alike have been able to capitalize on the 
benefits offered by being able to jettison objects both 
manually and robotically. 
 
Jettison also carries with it significant costs which must 
be weighed against the potential benefits.  On-orbit 
resources such as consumables, crew time, and vehicle 
reconfiguration costs can be imposing.  Ground 
resources can be heavily affected as well with the 
extensive amount of assessment and verification that 
must take place prior to approval.  Last, the opportunity 
costs of being unable to use EVA or Intravehicular 
Activity (IVA) time for other important tasks, such as 
science, could be prohibitive. 
 
Many examples exist where jettison has been used with 
varying levels of success throughout the life of the 
space program.  Specific applicable examples are 
addressed here to illustrate issues, hazards, 
workarounds, the jettison policy, and lessons learned for 
both the United States (US) Segment and the Russian 
Segment (RS) of the ISS. 
 
1.1. US Segment Jettison Case Examples 
In November of 2005 the Floating Potential Probe (FPP) 
was manually released from the ISS after staying there 
beyond its operational life.  The unit was so structurally 
degraded that it could not be safely returned to Earth or 
left in its installed position.  Caution had to be used not 
to break it during manipulation.   
 
In 2007, several noteworthy jettisons took place.  
January saw the release of Truss Bays 18 and 20 
Shrouds and Rotary Joint Motor Controller (RJMC) 
Covers, an example of a very large but also very 
lightweight set of objects that was very hard to collect 
into a small package and bundle together.  However, 
once the object was packaged, it was simple to jettison 
from the Articulating Portable Foot Restraint (APFR) 
position.  The Multiplexer / Demultiplexer (MDM_ 
Sunshade during that same period was an object that 
followed the process to a different end. 
 
Later, in July of 2007, the Early Ammonia Servicer 
(EAS) was finally given a GO for release and is another 
example of a piece of Hardware (HW) that had been on 
orbit beyond its design life and was no longer needed.  
The EAS jettison is a good example of the complexity 
of the Jettison process.  This object posed a risk not only 
to the ISS, but also to the shuttle, hence the inability to 
return it.  EAS was very large and unwieldy, was 
previously filled with ammonia, had handrails but was 
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 very hard to see around while simultaneously being 
held.  The Video Support Stanchion Assembly Flight 
Support Equipment (VSSA FSE) was released by the 
crew on the same EVA.  
 
1.2. RS Jettison Case Examples 
RS jettisons happen just as frequently as jettisons on the 
American side.  One of note is the Golf demo of 
February 2007.  This jettison used a non-standard 
format in that the jettison was performed by swinging a 
golf club to release a ball from a captive ‘tee’.  Changes 
had to be made to this jettison in order to make it safe 
such as limiting the ‘swing’ motion to a lighter and 
more reproducible ‘tap’ motion, and the the standard 
golf balls were swapped for whiffle type balls for the 
sake of safety to the fragile solar arrays and to preclude 
later recontact hazard with station 
 
A benign jettison case, the Splash Payload (P/L)  
thermal cover in July of 2008 illustrates that certain 
payload hardware require jettison of covers once they 
are installed.  In general these are specific examples of 
the process working.  The P/L developer conveys the 
information about the object of potential jettison and 
progresses through nominal channels through the 
process since no unique hazards are presented.  This 
same rationale is used for such things as towels, which 
do not require much coordination or tracking since they 
are such low mass and perform another vital safety 
function (needed to wipe off the RS EVA crewmen 
when working on the Service Module (SM) where they 
may come in contact with propellant byproducts). 
 
2. HAZARDS PRESENT 
Manual jettison poses critical and catastrophic hazard 
potential.  In some cases, the hazards are easily 
controlled, and in other cases, the respective program 
must accept the risk inherent to the jettison.  In the 
jettison process these risks and hazards are addressed in 
Hazard Reports (HRs).  Hazards include environmental 
thermal extremes, object-related EVA contact hazards, 
fatigue, several aspects of collision, and risk to persons 
on the ground.   
 
2.1. Environmental Thermal Extremes in the 
Jettison Position 
Any time the crew is placed in a location that is either 
known to be hot or known to be cold, the potential 
exists for the crewman to become overly cold or hot.  
For the cases where thermal assessment shows 
environmental thermal extremes, since safety by design 
is typically not an option, a valid control set consists of 
informing the crew of the hazard in procedures and 
training and preparing them for the likelihood.  In the 
case of the VSSA FSE and EAS, the crew was put into a 
known cold position and was handling large masses 
such that reconfiguring the Display and Control Module 
(DCM, the manually operated thermostat for the 
spacesuit) thermal setting during robotic slewing was 
impossible.  In this case the crew was warned to go to a 
setting that would provide comfort throughout the 
maneuver. 
 
2.2. Object-Related EVA Contact Hazards 
Any of the standard EVA contact hazards can be present 
on the jettisoned objects such as sharps edges, 
pinchpoints, touch temperatures, particulate 
contamination, etc.  Each of the individual controls will 
differ depending on the severity of the hazard but will 
follow the typical hazard control mitigation hierarchy 
dictated in Shuttle and Station Safety documentation. 
 
2.3. Fatigue 
Due to the important function served by EVA, timelines 
typically become packed with high priority tasks and the 
hazard of crew fatigue is always a potential concern.  If 
the crew is also performing a jettison the risk goes up 
since the jettisoned objects frequently require precise 
trajectories and velocities on release and may also need 
special handling due to other inherent hazards such as 
EVA contact hazards.  The Flight Surgeon is granted the 
latitude, per the Flight Rules (FRs), to continue or halt 
EVA operations based on his or her interpretation of the 
crew status and abilities.  For these reasons it is 
particularly important for the crew and ground 
controllers to be alert and aware of the signs of fatigue.  
If fatigue is sensed or predicted the crew is allowed and 
trained to take a break or request task omission.  
Depending on the priorities assigned to the tasks on the 
EVA, the tasks that end up getting omitted can differ 
from EVA to EVA. 
 
2.4. Collision Hazards 
The most significant hazards to the EVA and IVA crew, 
especially when handling large masses, are those of 
collision: EVA crew collision with structure, immediate 
jettisoned object contact with structure and later 
jettisoned object orbital recontact. 
 
EVA crew collision with structure – For jettison of 
small items this is usually not a concern since the crew 
has many options at their disposal for body restraint and 
positioning: APFR, Body Restraint Tether (BRT), 
handhold, Remote Manipulator System (RMS), etc.  
However, in some cases, due to induced loads, 
particularly for large mass objects and the subsequent 
potential for uncontrolled motion after a jettison throw, 
it is necessary to position the crew and even limit their 
force input to the foot restraint platform being used.  
 
Immediate jettisoned object contact with Structure – 
Most jettisons can reasonably attain retrograde 
 velocities on the order of tens of centimeters per second, 
so for most potential jettison items, it would be a 
catastrophic hazard for them to come into contact with 
the ISS or crew.  In order to preclude this, the crew can 
be placed in a preferred body position prior to the 
jettison.  Additionally the ISS itself can be positioned 
(attitude) and configured (stow or feather arrays) to 
eliminate or minimize the hazard potential.  If further 
mitigation is needed, the crew can be trained to jettison 
to some desired levels of accuracy, historically +/- 30 
degrees and within tens of centimetres per second. 
 
Jettisoned object orbital recontact – Depending on the 
mass and footprint of the jettisoned item, there exists a 
potential for the item to cross paths with the ISS or 
shuttle on later orbits based on complex orbital 
dynamics.  Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Russian 
Space Agency (RSA) controllers perform detailed 
design and analysis of orbital models to determine the 
likelihood of this occurrence.  Once the likelihood is 
determined the EVA team can know the criticality of 
achieving certain jettison velocities and trajectories.  
 
2.5. Stored Energy Release 
Objects may contain residual stored energy such as a 
pressure tank or battery that could explode or otherwise 
release while in close vicinity to the crew or vehicle.  
Should the energy release at a later time, this would fall 
under the Jettison Policy Letter requirement of having 
the object ‘passivated’ prior to jettison so burn-up and 
tracking can be better assured. 
 
2.6. Ground Impact 
Last but not least is the hazard presented by the object 
incompletely burning up on deorbit and the catastrophic 
hazard potential it presents to a person on the ground.  
NASA has explicit agency requirements for this case 
and if the jettisoned item cannot control re-entry 
parameters the agency must be willing to either accept 
the risk or not perform the jettison.  The following 
section outlines the risk threshold for NASA 
Headquarters (HQ) acceptance. 
 
3. PROCESS 
Experience has shown that jettisons can be performed 
safely but that achieving a safe jettison can be 
complicated.  The ISS program integration office 
drafted a Jettison Policy Letter [2] detailing the ISS 
program policy for the Jettison of items from the ISS 
which has gone through several revisions to obtain the 
concurrence of all affected parties including Safety, 
EVA program, ISS program, RSA, Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA), Japanese Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA), and the European Space Agency 
(ESA).  This letter forms the framework for jettisons 
and summarizes the agreements made by all the 
International Partners, Safety, EVA Program, Mission 
Operations Directorate (MOD), and the ISS and Shuttle 
Program Managers.   Within the boundaries drawn by 
the Jettison Policy Letter, applicable flight rules, hazard 
reports, safety panels, operations panels, and program 
boards, the path to performing a jettison can take 
months or even years.  In the background, time is also 
required to write procedures, train the crew, configure 
the vehicle, and many other activities beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
 
All considerations for jettison are first subject to 
international law [3].  An object can be considered 
acceptable for jettison if it meets the following criteria: 
less than 1/10000 risk of injury to persons on the ground 
[4], trackable, object(s) must be passivated / clustered / 
low risk for breakup, low risk for collision with ISS, 
meet ISS scheduling requirements, and not require an 
ISS debris avoidance maneuver [5]. 
 
Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the process flow for 
manual jettisons drawing on operational experience and 
lessons learned.  The following sections will discuss 
methods used to assure that the jettisons and the 
jettisoned objects are as safe as achievable and that the 
crew is adequately trained to be able to affect the safe 
jettison.  The big picture of the process includes five 
basic steps: jettison initiation, jettison planning, 
addressing jettison hazards, reaching a GO decision, and 
assessing the jettison.   
 
3.1. Jettison Initiation 
As shown in Fig 1, before jettison planning can start, the 
originator brings the jettison request, through the ISS 
Program Integration office (OM), to the Space Station 
Control Board (SSCB) for approval.  This approval 
request is the result of an ongoing discussion between 
the Astromaterials Research and Exploration Science 
Directorate – Human Exploration Science Office (KX).  
If approved, then the Jettison Planning process can 
begin. 
  
 
 
Figure 1 - Jettison Process Initiation 
 
3.2. Jettison Planning 
EVA planning forms a subset of the jettison planning, 
certification, and post-jettison assessment process.  Only 
the EVA-related subset is discussed here.  Reference 
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Figure 2 – Jettison Planning Flow 
 
The desired or required jettison parameters are dictated 
to the EVA community through planning team activity 
in Joint Operations Panels (JOPs) and / or Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) and the EVA team responds by 
training the crew to be able to perform the jettison as 
specified and developing procedures.  There are many 
challenges present, such as how to position the crew so 
they are in the best possible position to perform a safe 
release that will not contact structure immediately or in 
the future.  That position not only refers to the location 
of the crewman on the space vehicle but also the 
optimal body positioning.  For lighter objects, the body 
position and restraint can be simple, requiring only that 
the crew hold onto structure with one hand and throw 
with the other.  Alternatively, heavier objects can 
require the crew to position themselves in a foot 
restraint and in some cases has also required that the 
second EVA Crewman assist in handling the jettison 
item, the vehicle hold a specific attitude, and the robotic 
arm position the crew such that they are far away from 
structure. 
 
To address loading on the crewman, some specialized 
analysis must take place.  EVA requirements state that 
objects being handled over 750 lbm need to be given 
case-by-case assessment [6].  For such cases, where the 
crew will not only be handling the load, but potentially 
throwing the object, the trainers and crew must 
demonstrate that the throwing action is possible, within 
structural limits, and safe to perform.   
 
To that end the planning team develops a unique 
combination of Virtual Reality (VR) lab run 
demonstrations and tests, Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL) 
tests, and Precision Air Bearing Floor (PABF) tests 
depending on the specific item(s) being jettisoned.  
Each test generates different and overlapping data.  In 
the NBL, the crew’s ability to handle and jettison large 
sized loads can be verified as with EAS.  Visibility 
around large sized objects and volumetric assessment is 
also possible in the NBL testing environment.  
Additionally, the logistics of the Bay 18 and 20 covers 
could be practiced to show the ability of the crew to 
handle such large-sized and uncooperative objects.  In 
the VR lab the crew can practice and demonstrate, in as 
close to a zero-g environment as possible.  The VR lab 
has been used for many years to show that the crew is 
capable of handling large masses in excess of 1700 lbm.  
On the PABF tests have been run to show the ability of 
the crew to jettison items of large mass within a 
predefined vector.  Additionally, data was gathered to 
illustrate what the loads being input into the astronaut’s 
bootplate and APFR structure. 
 
Many of these EVA training activities have robotic 
components which must be coordinated with the 
appropriate robotics trainers and experts.   Loading on 
the robotic arm and into APFR structures are calculated 
and analysed both by the JSC robotics group and CSA 
partners.  They define acceptable limits which feed into 
the crew training skill set.  The crew is then trained to 
stay within those stated loads and procedures remind the 
crew to use smooth and steady motions, minimize 
APFR and Space Station RMS (SSRMS) loads, 
minimize recoil after jettison, and to not abort mid 
jettison unless crew / vehicle safety dictates.   
 
Effective handling, tethering, jettison, tool usage, and 
crew procedures are demonstrated similarly through VR 
lab runs, NBL runs, PABF tests depending on the 
specific item(s) being jettisoned and the unique skills 
needed to handle the objects.   
 
3.3. Addressing Jettison Hazards 
Part of the planning and certification process is gaining 
approval from the safety community for the jettison.  
The HW owner and the community of experts planning 
the EVA jettison must show the appropriate safety panel 
that the jettison presents acceptable risk and not 
introduce undue hazard potential, see Fig 2.  To this end 
the HW owner generates and / or updates Hazard 
Reports (HRs), typically Collision ISS-COL-1002 and 
EVA Collision ISS-EVA-0301, applicable P/L HRs, and 
Non-compliance Reports (NCRs) as necessary to reflect 
the specific jettison items being brought forward.   
 
Throughout the safety assessment process various safety 
boards such as the Joint American-Russian Space 
Working Group (JARSWG) to brief the jettison to our 
Russian partners, EVA Configuration Control Board 
(CCB) as a Certification of Flight Readiness (COFR) 
statement and overview for EVA management, Safety 
and Mission Assurance Panel (SMAP) as a special topic 
briefing for safety management, and to Safety and 
Mission Success Review (SMSR) as a special topic for 
HQ before and after the HRs and assessment are 
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 presented to the ISS Safety Review Panel (SRP).  Once 
the Hazard analysis has been approved and signed by 
the SRP it is briefed at Stage Operations Readiness 
Review (SORR) and moved forward to the Flight 
Readiness Review (FRR) process before given a final 
decision at the Mission Management Team (MMT) or 
the ISS MMT (IMMT). 
 
3.4. Reaching a GO Decision 
Two unique processes exist depending on the program 
but they both follow a similar format as shown in Fig 3.  
This process flow does not happen totally independently 
of the planning and hazard identification processes since 
many of the same players are present in the JOP and 
IPT forums.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Jettison GO / NO-GO Process  
(IMC - Increment Management Center, IDRD - 
Increment Definition and Requirements Document) 
 
When the jettison planning is nearing completion and 
the hazard analysis has shown that the jettison can be 
performed safely, the GO / NO-GO decision is given at 
the IMMT / MMT.  It should be noted that if 
management is not pleased with the jettison, a NO-GO 
decision can cause the planning process to go through 
more cycles. 
 
3.5. Assessing the Jettison 
On release, the crewmen provide commentary on 
direction, angles, speeds, similarity to training, SSRMS 
/ APFR movement (if applicable), and rotation for up to 
five minutes or until Mission Control Center (MCC) is 
satisfied.  This provides the teams with immediate 
feedback and an idea of the trajectory for the Flight 
Design and Dynamics Division – Orbital Dynamics 
Branch (DM 33) analysts to feed into their analysis 
software, giving a rough state vector.  Feedback also 
gives the teams an understanding of any complications 
that may have arisen during the jettison event. 
 
The Imagery Science and Analysis Group (ISAG) 
frequently records and analyzes the jettison.  Within 
several hours to one day they are able to improve the 
state vector estimate.  For the Golf demonstration, this 
imagery analysis was first shown to be useful in 
determining the planned versus actual trajectories.  It 
showed that the jettison method was unacceptable in 
terms of its capability of preventing collision with the 
ISS both immediately and in the longer term. 
  
Over the next several days after a jettison US Strategic 
Command Space Tracking (STRATCOM) is able to 
acquire and track objects of appropriate size.  Once 
acquired DM 33 and STRATCOM are able to further 
refine the state vector and to track the object through 
reentry.  This tracking provides the primary data set for 
assessing the effects of the jettisoned object on future 
ISS visiting vehicles. 
 
4. LESSONS LEARNED 
Each of the jettison cases presented herein have 
presented challenges throughout the jettison process.  
Those lessons have driven changes to the way that we 
perform jettisons, assess jettisons, capture hazards, and 
operate real-time in the control center, to name a few.  
The FPP jettison in 2005 showed us that the crew can 
successfully handle objects of questionable integrity as 
did the EAS jettison two years later.   
 
EAS presented its own unique challenges for the flight 
control team, management, crew, trainers, safety 
community, and IPs.  EAS and the VSSA FSE were 
very difficult objects for the astronaut to keep within the 
+/- 30 degree cone defined for both safety and for 
achieving the required state vector.  Although the 
training and analysis teams were convinced that the 
cone could be maintained, the crew’s lack of visual 
clues and the size / mass of the object compromised the 
task for EAS.  For the VSSA FSE, the irregular shape 
and center of mass caused the problem, but the crew 
was still able to achieve very good retrograde velocity 
in excess of predictions.  A revision to the Jettison 
Policy Letter was written to address the jettison cone 
issues and it should be noted that the IPs desired to 
know the clearances from structure rather than 
acceptable cone angles.  Loads input into the APFR and 
SSRMS were very hard to limit but the crew was able to 
control errant motion and load inputs to the extent that 
arm joint slippage was minimized to acceptable levels. 
 
For the Truss System Bays 18 and 20 Shrouds it was 
shown that crew training paid off with respect to 
stowing the shrouds.  As expected the jettison cone was 
very easy to maintain due to the light weight of the 
objects. 
 
2007 was a busy year for EVA jettison assessments.  
The MDM Sunshade is a story of an object that was 
shown to be unsafe to jettison in the midst of the 
approval process.  Its ballistic coefficient was too close 
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 to that of station and therefore shown to be too high of a 
risk for recontact.  It was brought inside the ISS in 
January 2007 and deorbited from station aboard a 
Progress freighter. 
 
On the Russian Segment, one of the jettison cases in 
particular has notable lessons.  While the Russian 
process follows a slightly different flowpath, with 
planning done by Russian experts, IVA-only US 
planning involvement, and the approval process picking 
up in the JOPs and IMMT the result is the same.  For 
the Golf demonstration extensive analysis and planning 
still could not prepare crew to perform a safe jettison, 
the ball was guaranteed to go in the required direction 
but later analysis showed that the ball was absolutely 
uncontrolled, and crew positioning was difficult - 
should have used a foot restraint for positive body 
control.  An on-orbit demonstration showed that the task 
could be done safely but EVA crew still could not 
complete it. 
 
Cover and towel jettisons typically go off without issue 
although the object information is difficult to obtain 
from certain IPs.  The Jettison Policy Letter, once again, 
has been modified in order to facilitate data exchange 
efficiencies. 
 
Limitations are present in any jettison situation.  For 
example, as we have seen, some hazards cannot be 
adequately controlled and the risk has to simply be 
weighed against the other options and potentially 
accepted.  If the risk is too great, alternative methods, 
even more costly ones, need to be used.  
 
5. FUTURE USE 
The goal of this paper was to capture what it takes to 
perform safe manual jettisons in the near Earth 
environment.  Obviously this operational and process 
knowledge can be extended to future space exploration 
scenarios that will likely have EVA and International 
Partner interfaces.  While Lunar mission scenarios do 
not have plans for manual EVA jettisons, it is likely that 
some hybrid scenarios could present themselves where 
either objects for potential intentional jettison or objects 
for robotic jettison will need to be assessed. 
 
For Mars missions it is likely that crewmen will venture 
outside the vehicle during transit.  Hence opportunities 
will be present for jettison.  Many hazards will remain, 
presenting either equal or more risk than an ISS or 
Shuttle jettison.  Since the Mars vehicle will likely be 
less restrictive than station in terms of size however the 
catastrophic potential of later recontact is just as real.  
To prevent later recontact new approaches to vectoring 
may need to be assessed, potentially orthogonal to the 
vehicle trajectory (out of the orbital plane).  
Environmental thermal extremes either in the jettison 
position or simply by the nature of venturing out the 
hatch will probably stay at about the same risk level as 
it is currently as will object-related EVA contact 
hazards.  Fatigue will still be an issue since even though 
the EVA(s) may be shorter, the crew will be operating 
in a chronically degenerated state.  For this same reason 
mass handling requirements to preclude immediate 
jettison item contact with structure and EVA crew 
collision with structure must be updated.  And finally, 
rapid safing or any other safing required for planetary 
deorbit will never go away but the timeliness of the 
jettison could require a modification to change the 
‘process’ to a ‘plan’.   
 
Many of the Safety hazards associated with Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) jettison will either go away for transfer-
type trajectories for interplanetary travel or reduce in 
risk.  For example we will no longer need to be 
concerned about recontact with ground.   
 
New hazards could also be presented due to the unique 
operating environment and in response to failures we 
may be unable to anticipate now. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier, jettisons are documented to have 
been performed maritime for generations as a voluntary 
sacrifice of cargo to lighten a ship's load since the 15th 
century [7].  In the future exploration of interplanetary 
space this ‘voluntary sacrifice’ will be no less useful 
than it was then and is now enabling us to proceed 
without undue risk to the crew and vehicle of keeping 
unsafe or unnecessary cargo.  Should situations dictate, 
we may even need to develop more sophisticated 
methods of manual and robotic jettison to further reduce 
the risk for near- and far-future missions. 
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